In Memoriam: Homer Smith

I wanted to take a moment to note the passing of Homer Smith, one of the greatest conceptual minds about offensive football.  Here is the Associated Press' write-up, via Sports Illustrated:

WEST POINT, N.Y. (AP) -- Former Army head coach Homer Smith, regarded as one of keenest offensive minds in the annals of college football, has died. He was 79.

Smith, coach of the Black Knights from 1974-78, died Sunday at his home in Tuscaloosa, Ala., after a four-year battle with cancer.

Smith was an assistant at several schools in his 39-year career, never staying long enough at any one place to put down roots. He coached at Stanford, Air Force, Alabama, Arizona, the NFL's Kansas City Chiefs, and served three stints as offensive coordinator at UCLA.

While with the Bruins, Smith developed seven future NFL quarterbacks, including Tommy Maddox, Jay Schroeder, and current UCLA coach Rick Neuheisel. Smith also was head coach at Davidson and Pacific.

Former UCLA head coach Terry Donahue once called Smith the best teacher of the game he had ever known.

"There are two men in my life who've made a real difference when it comes to football - Terry Donahue and Homer Smith are the reason I'm standing here ... right now," said Neuheisel, who played for the Bruins from 1979-83, during Smith's second stint as coordinator. "I miss Homer already."

Smith had an economics degree from Princeton, an MBA from Stanford and a master's in theological studies from Harvard. But it was the ebb and flow of offensive football that captivated him most.

Born on Oct. 9, 1931, Smith grew up in Omaha, Neb., and played fullback at Princeton, earning All-Ivy League honors. He rushed for 273 yards in a game against Harvard in 1952, before graduating two years later.

Smith began coaching in 1958 at Stanford. He spent four years at Air Force, and another seven at smaller schools - five at Davidson and two at Pacific - before joining Pepper Rodgers' UCLA staff in 1972.

It was there that Smith perfected the wishbone offense. In fact, UCLA set school records for total yards (470.6 per game) and rushing yards (400.3 per game) in 1973.

Smith took over at Army during the most difficult period in school history. Army was coming off an 0-10 season in 1973 and the Vietnam War was nearing an end. He made progress, compiling a 21-33-1 record before he was fired after a 28-0 loss to Navy.

Still, Smith's offenses excelled. When opposing defenses loaded the line of scrimmage to stop the ground-gobbling wishbone attack, the Black Knights unveiled their "Bomb Squad." Quarterback Leamon Hall, who later married Smith's daughter, Kim, set several academy passing records, and still holds the school record of 38 career touchdown passes.

Smith was a father figure as much as a coach.

"He touched so many lives," Hall told the Times Herald-Record of Middletown, N.Y. "I've been getting emails from generals and captains of industry who credit Homer for their success. Homer was a big influence on them hanging in there at West Point."

While at Alabama, the highlight of Smith's time there came in 1989 against Mississippi. Trailing by 21 points, the Crimson Tide scored 62 unanswered points.

Recalling that game in a tribute column, Tuscaloosa News sports writer Cecil Hurt said he asked Smith afterward what he was thinking during the comeback.

Smith responded with two words, in Latin: "Deo Gratis." (Thanks be to God.)

Smith spent his final two years as a coach at Arizona before retiring in 1997. He is survived by his wife, Kathy; two daughters, Cari Carpenter and Kim Hall; and four grandchildren. UCLA will hold a memorial service on campus June 12.

Read more: http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2011/football/ncaa/04/13/army-smith-obit/index.html#ixzz1KG2OBTFR

Smith was more than a master at developing Quarterbacks and coaching football.  He, more than anyone else, understood the conceptual basis that was offensive football--and coached practically every offense ever created.  As regular readers know, much of the under girding of my analysis comes from Smith.  In particular, Smith understood that the offense has two inherent advantages built into the rules of football--it controls the action, and it can dictate formations to the defense.  The defense must respond to both.  Therefore, whatever offense a team runs Smith knew they must exploit those advantages:

Every primary backfield action needs to threaten all 11 defenders. What a primary play needs is good counter plays. Every defender needs to be worried about the ball coming to his area - on a throwback screen, a reverse, a play-action pass, or whatever - as a play begins.

What makes a defender good is something to read. If he can say to himself something like, "As soon as that quarterback makes that half-assed fake, I’m going to find the tightend coming across and try to get an interception," if he can read initially and react accurately, he can play over his head. Counters, not mirrored primary plays, keep defenders from reading and jumping on plays.

This applies throughout an offensive system, from mirroring plays to mirroring pass patterns.  Similarly, the offense can dictate to the defense how many defenders must play on each side of the center-line, enabling an offense to exploit defenses that are too brittle to adjust:

When single-back formations waxed, the 5-3 defenses waned. Why? Because balancing on three centerline offenders - on a center, a QB, and a single-back - and keeping the MG/MLB tandem meant having a middle safety. One defender on the centerline will balance on three centerline offenders but two will not. Two will leave the defense out of balance and vulnerable on one side.

Defenses, by contrast, have the advantage that they can always outnumber the offense because one offender must carry the football.  Offenses, therefore, must take advantage of two things a)  massing players at the POA, and b) having offenders who can hold two defenders with a blocking threat and delayed pass threat.  This is particularly important at the goalline, where a deep safety is not needed.  Hence the prevalent use of tight ends.  Smith gives the best explanation for a tight end's value. 

It takes a sixth frontal player (not counting the QB) to pull an identifiable pass defender into the front and to give the blockers something to work with to keep the center off the island. It takes the sixth, just as it takes him to deal with a blitz.

Which is a better sixth [blocker, a tight-end or a runningback]? A TE is more of a threat with the delayed pass that makes the pass defender on him stay at bay while the TE blocks the rusher. I think a TE is the better.

Smith was also an expert on two-minute offense.  In particular, Smith emphasized how spiking the football is nearly always a bad idea because it is a wasted down--at worst you could simply walk to the line and quickly throw a fade pattern.  Unfortunately, this is advice that too many coaches often ignore.

Smith was innovating throughout his career.  In fact, he was one of the first to predict the rise of the 'spread' offense with the quarterback as a run threat, by putting his defensive counterpart in a difficult position:

The spread offense today features the running QB. Defensive problems come from not having a tackler ready for the QB at the line of scrimmage. . . . As long as running QBs keep winning the jobs, the spread will be the formation of choice. Someone has to tackle the QB. If that someone is looking for a post pass, the QB is going to have running room.